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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a proposal with the potential to greatly improve
the ability of developing countries to reduce their exposure to other countries￿
interest rate and exchange rate volatility and to lower their cost of raising capital
abroad. The key to achieving these goals is for developing countries to borrow
in their own currencies and for investors to lend by creating portfolios of local-
currency government debt securities that employ the risk management technique
of diversification to generate a return-to-risk that competes favourably with other
major capital market security indices. We show, based on data from the early
1990s, that a portfolio of emerging market local currency debt can generate
rates of return relative to risk that compete with those of major securities indices
in international capital markets. It bears noting that the early 1990s witnessed
several severe shocks to international capital markets, including the crises in
East Asia, the Russian Federation and Brazil, and the failure of Long-Term
Capital Management. We also analyse the implications of deploying such a policy
for attracting capital to developing countries, the impact on the stability of their
financial systems and on their costs of borrowing, and the implications for future
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The massive amount of foreign indebtedness
is one of the most significant problems facing de-
veloping countries today. The majority of this debt
is denominated in the major currencies,1 and it has
left developing countries with enormous exposures
to foreign exchange and foreign interest rate risk.
External shocks transmitted through these exposures
have proven costly to absorb. Most of the emerging
market crises over the past two decades were caused,
or at least exacerbated, by foreign borrowings (al-
though derivatives have added substantially to foreign-
currency-denominated liabilities in some cases2).
Concerns over foreign debt were raised soon after
the 1973 oil price shock, and the problem became
apparent in the early 1980s after Mexico announced
it would be unable to meet its debt payments in Au-
gust of 1982. More recently, outstanding dollar
linked bonds were one of the main triggers of the
1994 Mexican crisis; dollar denominated private debt
was one of the factors in the 1997 Asian crisis; and
Argentina￿s large issues of external debt was a pri-
mary factor in its 2001 default.
Most of the economic policy research since the
developing country debt crisis broke out in 1982 has
focused on solving the problem of foreign investors
managing their credit risk exposure and the problem
of developing countries adjusting to the variability
of foreign capital flows and financial crises. Less
attention was given to strategies to help developing
countries reduce their foreign exchange exposure.
More recently, the issue of foreign exchange risk
arising from foreign indebtedness has received greater
as a result of a new body of economic policy research
around the ￿original sin￿ hypothesis of Eichengreen
and Hausmann (1999). There is now some new
thinking about the challenge faced by developing
countries in moving away from foreign-currency-
denominated borrowing.
In this paper, we take up that challenge by build-
ing on the early experiments3 and providing a policy
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analysis of what we hope will prove to be a major
new financial innovation to financing development.
It improves market efficiency by overcoming some
existing market imperfections. It requires negligi-
ble statutory or regulatory changes. And it does not
necessarily require the involvement of such interna-
tional financial institutions as the IMF or World
Bank, although it may well benefit from some offi-
cial or public sector sponsorship.
Our proposal is to raise capital in international
markets by forming diversified portfolios of emerg-
ing market local currency debt (LCD) issued by
sovereign governments. We show that the returns
on such a portfolio are sufficiently independent to
allow a substantial reduction in portfolio variance
through diversification, to produce a risk-return pro-
file ￿ measured in dollars ￿ that is competitive with
major United States and European security indices.
In the following section we will discuss the
context of this problem and the economic literature
that addresses it. Following that, we develop the fi-
nancial economic basis for the LCD portfolio and
analyse its financial performance relative to some
familiar alternative investments. We then analyse the
development and economics implications of this new
financing facility for developing economies and of-
fer concluding comments.
Overview of the issue
One key difference between advanced and de-
veloping economies4 is that the latter generally
cannot borrow in international capital markets in
their own currency.5 While other distinguishing fea-
tures include the capital-labour ratio, productivity,
education levels, and sophisticated financial systems,
the inability of developing countries to borrow in-
ternationally in their own local currency is a critical
element affecting their financial stability.
Many developing countries need capital inflows
to augment domestic savings so as to obtain a pace
of investment consistent with rapidly rising growth.
In addition to foreign direct investment, developing
countries need capital investment in the form of
credit. If they are unable to negotiate terms denomi-
nated in their own local currency, then they must
enter into a Faustian compact in which the joys of
lower interest rates are held captive by the obliga-
tion to repay in foreign currency denominations.
Market description: foreign currency claims
While foreign debt can play a useful economic
role in development by supplementing domestic sav-
ings, its currency denomination can create unwanted
exposure to exchange rate risk. Consider the break-
down of developing country long-term external debt.
The latest year for which data are available on cur-
rency composition is 2000 (from the World Bank￿s
Global Development Finance database). The total
long-term external debt that year was $2,047.7 bil-
lion (it would rise to $2,644 billion through the end
of 2003). Of that, 64 per cent was denominated in
dollars, 12 per cent in yen, and 9.5 per cent is in
Deutsche mark, French francs and pound sterling.
The six currencies comprise at least 85.5 per cent of
the long-term indebtedness of developing countries;
another 7.6 per cent was debt in ￿multiple curren-
cies￿ (these six currency likely make up a large share
of this figure) and 7.2 per cent in all other curren-
cies.6
Two particular examples, drawn from Mexico
and the Republic of Korea just prior to their finan-
cial crises, illustrate the predominance of major
currencies, and the lack of their own local currencies,
in denominating their foreign debts. In December
of 1994, 61 per cent of Mexico￿s long-term foreign
debt was denominated in dollars, 21 per cent in ￿mul-
tiple currency￿ formulas, and 9 per cent in yen.
Measured at year-end 1996 ￿ the last data point prior
to the financial crisis ￿ the dollar composition of
long-term debt of the Republic of Korea was 79 per
cent, while that in yen and multiple currencies stood
at 13 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Thus,
92 per cent of the foreign debt of the Republic of
Korea was in two major currencies: the dollar and
the yen.
Consequences of foreign currency borrowing
The consequences of foreign currency denomi-
nated indebtedness are a major source of developing
country￿s exposure to international disruptions and
disturbances, as well as their vulnerability to domes-
tic fiscal solvencies and exchange rate systems. This3 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
the more fragile economies of developing countries
subject to monetary policy changes in the country
(or countries) whose currency denominates their in-
ternational debt. If foreign central banks tighten
monetary policy and raise interest rates, this will
increases foreign currency interest payments for the
developing countries on both variable rate debt and
new issuances while they will also see the market
value of their foreign currency assets reduced. For
example, in the 10 months prior to the financial cri-
sis in Mexico in December 1994, the Federal Reserve
raised short-term interest rates six times, from 3 per
cent to 5.5 per cent and the dollar rose by more than
7 per cent against other Group of Ten (G-10) cur-
rencies. This put enormous external pressure, on the
peso while diminishing the Mexican central bank￿s
capacity to defend it. Similarly, it was the rapid rise
in United States interest rates in response to the oil
price hike in the late 1970s that precipitated the Latin
American debt crises of the 1980s.7
An appreciation in the value of the foreign cur-
rency of denomination would also raise the cost of
servicing foreign debt and put pressure on the inter-
national value of the local currency. In the months
preceding the first East Asian crisis, the dollar ap-
preciated substantially against the Japanese yen.
Starting in August 1996, the dollar rose 8.2 per cent
by January 1997; it was up 19 per cent by May 1997
when the Thai baht was hit by speculative attacks;
by December 1997, the dollar had risen 25.5 per cent
over the previous 14 months. This had the effect of
substantially raising the value of Thailand￿s dollar
denominated debt, and in comparison, lowering the
value of their yen-denominated exports.
The accumulation of international debt denomi-
nated in foreign currency poses a danger to more
fragile financial systems, which often have dollar-
denominated liabilities and local currency assets.
Borrowing in foreign currency causes a ￿currency
mismatch￿ that exposes the developing country to
devaluation or some other international disruptions;
and borrowing short-term causes ￿maturity mis-
match￿ that exposes the country to other volatile
economic sources that contribute to creating a frag-
ile financial system. It creates a economic precipice
by dramatically raising the cost of devaluation, and
it makes policymakers more reluctant to let the cur-
rency devalue even when it becomes overvalued.8
Foreign-currency borrowing also reduces a
country￿s ability to pursue independent monetary and
fiscal policy. The country￿s monetary policy is con-
strained through its impact on exchange rates and,
in turn, its impact on the local currency cost of serv-
icing foreign debt. Thus, a central bank that would
otherwise respond to a contractionary shock by eas-
ing credit conditions would be hampered from doing
so for fear of the reducing its currency value and
thereby raising the cost of servicing its foreign debt.
Foreign-currency borrowing also undermines
the credibility of central banks in developing coun-
tries because their foreign reserves, which might
amount to a significant proportion of their imports
and trade balances, can be dwarfed by the country￿s
foreign-currency debt obligations. Foreign-currency
indebtedness therefore necessitates increased hold-
ings of foreign reserve, which can be quite expensive.9
The ability to engage in fiscal policy of for-
eign-currency borrowers is also affected. It is con-
strained because any increase in the fiscal deficit will
widen the country￿s credit spread and further push
up the cost of borrowing. High foreign indebtedness
forces countries to follow pro-cyclical macroeco-
nomic policies, raising interest rates and tightening
fiscal policy during a recession.10 Foreign-currency
borrowing also undermines the fiscal credibility of
developing countries because so much of their sov-
ereign debt is known to be denominated in foreign
currency.
On the other hand, borrowing in local currency
adds to the tax base for seigniorage revenue in the
home country owing to the increase in demand for
the local currency for the purpose of trading in the
local currency instrument, as well as in the process
of making and receiving payments on those securi-
ties.
Yet an additional benefit is that the develop-
ment and growth in the market for the local currency
government securities plays a critical role ￿ as a foun-
dation or skeletal structure ￿ in promoting more
￿mature￿ domestic securities markets.
The danger from amassing foreign currency
debt is so great that it calls into doubt the efficiency
of international capital markets in distributing risk.
Why is the foreign exchange risk so dispropor-
tionally held by those least able to bear it? If this
distribution of risk signals a market imperfection,
then it highlights the need for an innovation or new
public policy to rectify it.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
Recognition of a problem
The recognition of the problem of borrowing
in foreign currency is not new. Soon after develop-
ing countries￿ indebtedness began to rise rapidly
following the 1973 oil price hike, and well before
Mexico￿s payment crisis erupted in August 1982,
there were public policy discussions of this concern.
One notable contribution to the debate came from
Gerald Pollack (1974), an Exxon Corporation ex-
ecutive writing in Foreign Affairs, who offered an
early warning of the consequences of large, dollar-
denominated borrowing by developing countries. He
stated, ￿the Eurocurrency market has several defects
for present purposes￿ and particularly ￿the Euro-
currency market is not well suited to resource-poor
or politically unstable developing countries with low
credit standing.￿ He warned, ￿[t]his question of fi-
nancial instability may turn out to be the biggest of
the threats posed by the energy crisis.￿
Commenting upon the build-up of large foreign
debts after the first and second oil price hike, Walter
J. Levy (1980) stated, ￿The debt problem could, of
course, be solved if the values of the currencies in
which the debts are incurred decline ... [which] in
fact did occur between 1974 and 1978 ... But it seems
now that the jig is up.￿
Writing just prior to the 1982 payments crisis,
Bacha and Diaz-Alejandro (1982) expressed con-
cerns about prospective borrowing conditions in the
1980s that were ￿moderately pessimistic relative to
repeating the favourable performance of the 1970s.￿
With regard to dollar-denominated debt, they stated,
￿A major uncertainty for LDC borrowers looking at
the 1980s is whether the low or even negative real
rates of interest prevailing during the 1970s will re-
turn.￿ In particular they cited the risk of tightening
monetary policy in the United States as a factor lead-
ing to higher interest rates and a higher dollar.
Much of the academic economics literature is
focused on the issue of the credit risk faced by the
international banks acting as intermediaries in this
recycling process. Two noteworthy contributions
came from Laurie Goodman (1980 and 1981). In a
1980 study for the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
she provided an exemplary descriptive analysis of
the financial instruments used for recycling petro-
dollars, and she then analysed the pricing of these
syndicated, dollar-denominated, variable-rate bank
loans. The principal concern at the time was whether
the loans, which were priced as a spread above
LIBOR, generated sufficient returns to banks￿ port-
folios in proportion to their credit risk for the banks.
In a follow-up study, Goodman (1981) analysed
the possible problems of credit risk from the point
of view of lenders. She empirically tested a model
of diversification to show that banks could gain by
diversifying their credit risks across countries. Al-
though only limited data were available at that time,
Goodman showed that the country risks associated
with lending to various developing countries were
more different than similar ￿ that is, the unique risk
is greater than the common or systematic risk. Since
it is the unique risk that can be reduced through di-
versification, Goodman suggested that international
banks could successfully manage the risk on their
loans to developing countries through diversifica-
tion.
One of the first articles in the economics lit-
erature to discuss the market risk associated with
foreign-currency borrowing (as opposed to credit
risk) in the context of international lending to de-
veloping countries was written by Lessard (1983).
Writing in the wake of Mexico￿s debt crisis in Au-
gust of 1982, Lessard pointed out that the form of
debt issued to developing countries was ￿unsound￿,
and that criticism had been too focused on the quan-
tity of foreign borrowing and not sufficient attention
was being paid to the fact that ￿[foreign lending] is
structurally unsound and is likely to result in mis-
judgments and misbehaviour on the part of lenders
and borrowers.￿ He went on to clarify what he meant
by structurally unsound, stating that ￿a financial sys-
tem that relies overwhelmingly on bank credit is
unlikely to be an ideal system in terms of world
welfare ... it involves debt service patterns that vary
perversely with LDCs￿ net foreign exchange earn-
ings ... [and] it shifts risks from LDCs to world capital
markets only through default [i.e., bankruptcy].￿
While drawing needed attention to key features
of foreign debt, such as the problems caused by their
variable interest rate structure, Lessard failed to
strictly identify foreign exchange risk as a major
source of the ￿perverse variability of debt service
obligations￿. Perhaps he took for granted that for-
eign debt would be denominated in foreign currency.
Lessard did, however, foresee the more recent trend
in development finance research, discussed below,
by recommending that debt service be stabilized
through the use of price level index-linked loans.5 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
Contemporary insights into foreign
exchange risk
Whereas the problems associated with devel-
oping countries￿ exposure to foreign exchange risk
have been recognized by some people for quite
awhile, they have attracted greater attention in re-
cent years. This can be attributed to the research and
provocative title ￿ the ￿original sin￿ hypothesis11 ￿
developed by Hausmann, Eichengreen and others.
Their work in Hausmann et al. (2001 and 2002) and
Eichengreen et al. (2002 and 2003) has made a sig-
nificant contribution to the study of development
economics and sparked a much needed debate on
exposure to foreign exchange risk. It has also con-
tributed to the policies designed to raise living
standards in the developing world by focusing at-
tention squarely on the risks associated with the
investment vehicles that conducted capital to devel-
oping countries. (A summary of their Emerging
Market Index, as well as a discussion of its short-
comings, are included below in appendix A.)
Simply put, Hausmann and his colleagues ar-
gue that the principal problem facing development
finance is that developing countries cannot borrow
in their own currency. Instead they have borrowed
in ￿hard￿ currencies such as the dollar, euro (and it
predecessors), sterling, and yen and this has exposed
them to foreign exchange rate fluctuations not en-
tirely within their control.12 Had these countries been
able to borrow in their own currency, Hausmann et
al. conclude, they would have been better able to
handle shocks and other policy errors.
Dodd (2001) identifies currency mismatches as
a major source of vulnerability affecting financial
sector stability in developing countries and analy-
ses the role of derivatives in increasing the magnitude
of the mismatch. Developing country financial in-
stitutions were able to resort to derivatives, often
unregulated or under-regulated as off-balance sheet
items, to achieve greater leverage and circumvent
restrictions on their balance sheet￿s currency mis-
matches. The result was that they did not hedge their
long dollar and short local currency mismatch, but
rather took larger short dollar positions in order to
capture the gains from the substantial interest rate
differential between the dollar and their local currency.
Dodd pointed out the difficulty for governments, as
well as private sector investors, in monitoring the
volume of open interest and trading volume in a
market that has no regulation to require reporting
and disclosure.
Expanding on a problem they identified in
1996,13 Goldstein and Tucker (2004) provide a com-
prehensive policy analysis that addresses the issue
of currency risk head on, that is, the exposure to
foreign-currency mismatches leaves developing
countries vulnerable to financial shocks, deepens the
impact from the shock, and hampers the use of mon-
etary policy in preventing a contraction or crisis. The
Goldstein and Tucker thesis ￿ although largely dis-
tracted by its authors￿ effort to refute the ￿original sin￿
hypothesis that bad things happen to good countries
￿ does provide a useful explanation for why cur-
rency mismatches are important and how to best
measure them. Unfortunately the book￿s policy rec-
ommendations are little different from the advice
offered before these insights were established. In-
stead of trying to address the problem directly, the
authors advocate inflation targeting, floating instead
of fixed exchange rates regimes, and fiscal rectitude
in government budgets.
Allen et al. (2002), of the IMF￿s Policy Devel-
opment and Review Department provides an
authoritative and comprehensive analysis of the bal-
ance sheet aspects of developing country financial
crises. They identify the major types of risk that char-
acterize a nation￿s balance sheet vulnerability and
site foreign currency mismatch as a major factor,
saying that ￿Almost all recent crisis episodes were
marked by currency mismatch exposures.￿ One of
their key conclusions is that ￿The currency and ma-
turity structure of the outstanding debt stock is almost
as important as the total size of the debt stock.￿ An-
other is that ￿A currency mismatch anywhere in the
economy constrains the government￿s capacity to act
as a lender of last resort in domestic currency.￿
The policy recommendations of Allen et al.
include the need to develop local currency equity
and debt (especially long-term debt) markets in
order to raise capital while limiting financial vul-
nerability. This includes developing derivatives
markets ￿ although they recommend that ￿attention
must be paid to the risks incurred by those who are
supplying the hedging instruments￿ (Allen, 2002).
Allen et al. also cite the need to hold larger foreign
reserves and the need for great external official lend-
ing (i.e., IMF, World Bank, and bilateral lending).
However, as discussed earlier, holding foreign
reserves can be expensive for developing countries.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
Furthermore, additional external borrowing in for-
eign currencies ￿ whether it be by the IMF, World
Bank, or the private sector ￿ will only to exacerbate
the problem of currency mismatch associated with
external debt. The international financial institutions
need to look instead towards the more radical ap-
proach of lending in local currencies. In the following
sections of this paper we will analyse this possibility
in more detail, and show why lending in local cur-
rencies is not a high risk strategy for foreign creditors.
Salvation through diversification:
a policy remedy
We believe that there is a better way to finance
development. In this section, we develop a policy
remedy that is both economically more efficient and,
if politics is truly ￿the art of the possible￿, more
politically feasible. One important testament to its
viability is that, as described below, it has already
been successfully pursued by at least one major as-
set manager.
We will call this approach the ￿emerging mar-
ket local currency debt portfolio￿ (or LCD). The
original idea for this portfolio-based approach draws
heavily on the work of Shari Spiegel, based on her
experience in creating and managing a diversified,
local currency developing country debt portfolio for
Lazard Freres (from May 1995 to January 2003).14
The fund was operated with the goal of capturing
high rates of return paid on local currency securities
while reducing risk through diversification.
The LCD proposal does not require that inter-
national financial institutions such as the IMF or
World Bank play a pivotal role in its success. These
official financial institutions could, however, make
highly productive contributions (see below).
Although the LCD policy is low cost and fea-
sible, its potential benefits are substantial. It offers
direct help to countries to enable them to borrow in
their own currencies ￿ both at home and abroad ￿ in
what could become a seamless market. The gains
from this alone are potentially enormous. Develop-
ing economies will benefit also from greater stability
as a result of their reduced exposure to changes in
foreign exchange rates and interest rates, which are
all the greater because of their correlation, in the
dollar and other major currencies. They will also gain
from increased seigniorage and from potentially
lower costs of borrowing in their local currency.
Staying with the theme of Christian theology
inspired by Hausmann￿s work, the LCD portfolio
will lead to ￿ if not outright redemption of ￿original
sin￿ ￿ absolution of worldly sins so as to facilitate
progressive steps toward financial salvation.
The portfolio approach
The core idea of the LCD approach is to apply
the insights of portfolio theory,15 part of the disci-
pline of financial economics ￿ toward enabling
developing countries to borrow in their own curren-
cies. The insight offered by portfolio theory is that a
portfolio consisting of different securities whose re-
turns are sufficiently independent (and especially so
if they are negatively correlated) can yield superior
risk-adjusted rates of returns than the individual se-
curities. In other words, the volatility of the whole
is less than that of the sum of its parts.
The LCD portfolio would work by buying lo-
cal currency government debt16 instruments from
many different developing countries and combining
them so as to produce a portfolio whose return and
variance would be competitive in international capi-
tal markets. The market risk, which consists of the
uncertainty of domestic interest rates (i.e., interest
rates in local currency assets) and exchange rates of
each local currency security, is often significant.
From 1994 to 2003, the average volatility of individual
country returns on local currency debt instruments
was nearly 16 per cent.17 At the same time, yields on
local currency debt were also high, at 13.7 per cent
on average, but not high enough to compensate for
the risk. Hence investing in any one local currency
market was not attractive.
Combining the returns on individual country
securities into a portfolio, however, does produce
desirable results. As we will show below, returns on
a diversified portfolio range from 8￿10 per cent an-
nually while the risk of a diversified portfolio drops
substantially to approximately 5.5 per cent (which
is in line with United States investment grade bonds).
Note that this approach does not involve hedg-
ing the currency risk. It is very expensive to reduce7 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
this market risk by hedging with derivatives because
the cost of hedging is equivalent to the differential
between foreign and local interest rates and, as dis-
cussed above, local interest rates tend to be very high.
Another reason why hedging costs may be expen-
sive is that there are a disproportionate amount of
short-hedgers in the market and a relative shortage
of speculators willing to speculate on long-positions
in local currencies.18
In other words, the costs of the hedge over-
whelm the benefit of cross-border borrowing or
investing. In this context, the most cost-effective
method for mitigating risk exposure is achieved
through diversification across different countries￿
local currency debt. It is the unique aspect of this
risk that can be substantially reduced through diver-
sification. The reason for this is that, historically,
currency devaluations have had extremely low cor-
relations.
We began our analysis by examining the ex-
change rates of 46 developing countries, (leaving
out Latvia from above). The countries were selected
primarily on the basis of the availability monthly
data since 1980; we then eliminated some countries
that had extraordinarily stable exchange rates such
as Saudi Arabia and Oman and we dropped Zimba-
bwe for the opposite reason. The annual rate of
change in all of these countries￿ exchange rates be-
tween January 1995 and March 2004 was 9.8 per
cent; and of the 37 countries that had data doing
back to January 1990, the average rate of change
was 10.2 per cent over the longer 14-year period
(with highs reaching -78.4 per cent and -43 per cent
annually for Brazil and Romania respectively).
We than analysed the monthly rates of change
for 47 developing country currencies from January
1980 to March 2004. The average correlation be-
tween the rates of change for those 47 countries
during that time period was 0.0713 ￿ in other words,
not a high degree of correlation on average. The
average correlation coefficients for the individual
countries are listed in table 1.
Diversification is also a means of reducing
credit risk. For most local currency securities, how-
ever, credit risk is not the primary risk. Most devel-
oping countries are more highly rated for debt
obligations in their own currencies than in foreign
currencies. Table 2 shows several recent examples ￿
Brazil is the only exception ￿ of how local currency
Table 1
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Data: IMF, International Financial Statistics.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
credit ratings are usually two notches above that on
foreign currency debts. With the exception of the
Russian Federation, default on local-currency gov-
ernment debt has been extremely rare. The primary
risk to investing in local-currency government debt
is the domestic market risk (interest rate and ex-
change rate uncertainty).
From an investor￿s perspective, credit risk is
the primary risk on external debt, such as long-term
Eurobonds, issued by developing countries. Consider
the comparison of credit risk on dollar-denominated
securities versus market risk on local currency de-
nominated securities. These are captured by the
average correlation coefficients for the Emerging
Local Markets Index (ELMI)+ and the Emerging Mar-
kets Bond Index (EMBI)+, calculated by JP Morgan.
The ELMI+ index measures the rates of return
(change in price plus interest payments) on local-
currency debt securities in each of the 25 listed
countries. The EMBI+ index measures the rate of
return on United States dollar denominated debt secu-
rities in the 20 countries listed. There are 13 countries
for which there are both ELMI+ and EMBI+ data.19
The correlation coefficients are presented in
table 3. Some of the correlation coefficients have
high p-values which suggests that there are some pe-
riods of time in which the correlations are higher (as
well as lower) than the coefficients would indicate.
The correlation coefficients under the column
ELMI+ measure the average correlation between the
country (in the column to the immediate left) and




(May 1993￿May 2004, monthly)
ELMI+ EMBI+ Difference
Argentina -0.011 0.396 0.407




Colombia 0.059 0.419 0.360
Czech Republic 0.103
Ecuador 0.454
Egypt 0.044 0.487 0.444





Malaysia 0.151 0.390 0.239





Philippines 0.133 0.466 0.333
Poland 0.174 0.514 0.339
Republic of Korea 0.159 0.405 0.246
Russian Federation 0.202 0.431 0.228
Singapore 0.187
Slovakia 0.078
South Africa 0.065 0.126 0.061
Taiwan Prov. of China 0.186
Thailand 0.230
Turkey 0.074 0.334 0.260
Ukraine 0.360
Venezuela 0.121 0.465 0.344
Average 0.120 0.445 0.312
Note: ELMI+ adjusted for euro/dollar rates for Central
Europe.
Table 2















Republic of Korea A AA-
South Africa BBB A-
Thailand BBB A-
Data: Fitch Ratings, February 2004.9 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
rows indicate there are no data for that country in
either ELMI+ or EMBI+). The average correlation
is pretty low and is negative for Argentina.
The coefficients under the EMBI+ column are
the same measures but for dollar denominated
foreign debt. Note that they are, on average, sub-
stantially higher than for local currency debt
securities. For the 13 countries for which there are
common data the average correlation coefficient is
0.312 higher for the credit risk reflected in the
EMBI+ than for market risk reflected in the ELMI+
series.
The financial economic lesson to be drawn from
this comparison is that the potential reductions in
market risk through diversification are greater than
the potential reductions in credit risk.
Principles of financial economics applied to
constructing an LCD portfolio
Given these properties of exchange rates and
market returns, a portfolio of local currency debt
securities can be constructed so as to provide for-
eign investors with an attractive investment vehicle.
Four interrelated decisions must be made in
choosing the securities to be included in the portfo-
lio: the number (n) of securities; which countries to
include among the n in the portfolio; which securi-
ties in each country to include; and the weight of
each security in the portfolio.
The decision to choose certain securities for
inclusion in the portfolio will depend upon their re-
turns, the distribution of those returns, and the
correlation with other securities in the portfolio. If
the distributions of returns on the n securities have
sufficient independence, then their combined yield
and variance will produce a portfolio return and vari-
ance that compete with benchmark fixed income
portfolios from the advanced capital markets in the
major currency economies ￿ e.g., United States cor-
porate bonds ￿ and have substantially less volatility
than such equity indices as the Standard and Poor￿s
(S&P) 500, DAX, the Financial Times Stock Ex-
change (FTSE) 100, and the Nikkei 225 stock indexes.
An expression for the country returns ￿ com-
prised of changes in the exchange rate, interest
payments, and the change in price of the local debt
instrument ￿ can be derived from the following equa-
tion for interest rate parity, where r is the dollar or
major currency rate of return (coupon payments plus
change in market price), r* is the local current rate
of return, and e is the exchange rate in consecutive
periods.20
(1)
Equation (2) represents the portfolio rate of
return (rp) from period t to period t+1 from invest-
ing in n countries￿ local currency securities, where
each country is weighted by a factor x in the portfolio.
(2)
The role of diversification in forming the port-
folio is critical. The LCD portfolio would consist of
a sufficient number of different securities from dif-
ferent countries so as to reach acceptable levels of
market and credit risk.
The variance of the portfolio (σp) is determined
according to the following equation (3), where x cor-
responds to the weights of the securities in the port-
folio, ρ is the correlation coefficient, σ is the standard
deviation, the subscript p denotes portfolio, and the
securities in the portfolio are represented by i and j.
(3)
The main idea is to combine securities with
different distributions so that the variance of the
combination is potentially less than that of each of
the individual securities. If the securities have a nega-
tive correlation, then the variance of the combination
￿ that is, the portfolio ￿ can be very small. If they
are not negatively correlated but nonetheless have
low correlations, then the portfolio variance can still
be greatly reduced, so that the variance of the whole
is less than that of the sum of the parts.
Up to now, we have assumed that market risk
includes both interest rate and currency risk. The
two can, however, be unbundled and analysed sepa-
rately which is crucial to the decision of which
maturities to include in the portfolio. The data are
limited because in many countries there are no ro-
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bust data available on ￿long-term￿ interest rates.
Experience in trading these securities indicates that
correlations are low across local interest rate mar-
kets as well as currency markets. However, there is
a correlation between interest rates and the currency
within a country that is taken into account in the fol-
lowing formula.
The additional risk added to a portfolio (σD)
from extending the maturity or duration21 of invest-
ments in the ith local currency securities can be
measured by the following formula:
 σDi = (w2σC
2 + D2σr
2 + 2wρDσcσr)‰ (4)
where w is the country weight, D is the contribution
to duration, ρ is the correlation coefficient, and σc
and σr are the standard deviations of the exchange
rate and interest rate.
The decision of the optimal number of securi-
ties to include in a portfolio depends on the marginal
benefit of the nth security to the portfolio variance.
There are perhaps 40 or more countries whose local
currency securities are suitable for inclusion in an
LCD portfolio. Both theoretical reasoning and em-
pirical testing support the case that the marginal
benefit to diversification declines as the number of
securities is increased. The rate at which the benefits
diminish will depend on the degree of independence
of the returns so that a portfolio of completely inde-
pendent securities will quickly overwhelm the benefits
of diversification by eliminating all ￿unique￿ risk
and leave only ￿systematic￿ or common risk. In actual
markets there are degrees of independence and in-
terdependence. As the marginal benefit diminishes,
the transactions costs and portfolio management
costs rise with the number of securities.
Empirical studies of the United States equity
markets, as discussed in Sharpe (1970), estimate that
a portfolio with 10 securities will have 7 per cent
more risk than the minimum (i.e., that of the market
portfolio without diversifiable risk) and a portfolio
of 20 securities will have only 3 per cent more than
the minimum. The actual determination of the optimal
number of securities will depend on the correlations
and the transactions costs required to obtain and
manage such a portfolio.
Our preliminary analysis of data from emerg-
ing markets in the 1990s indicates that the benefits
to diversification flatten off after the nineteenth se-
curity. Thus, a portfolio of 20 securities would serve
as a good estimate of the minimum number of securi-
ties necessary for diversification to be fully effective.
The decision on the weighting of securities in
the portfolio can be driven by different motivations.
One approach would be to treat the portfolio as if it
were an index in which country weights replicated
the share of the respective economy or the market
size of the security￿s issuance relative to the others
represented in the portfolio.22 Most, but not all, se-
curity indices in advanced capital markets are based
on weights that reflect the market capitalization of
the security. However, the size of local-currency debt
markets is generally quite difficult to measure. Most
securities are traded over the counter and include
bank paper and even derivative products that are not
easy to quantify. In addition, government securities
markets can be extremely illiquid, with a proportion
of the securities held by the central bank or the Treas-
ury, so that the number of outstanding issuances is
not a good indicator of the tradable size of the market.
Another approach, followed by the JP Morgan
ELMI/ELMI+, is to weight countries by the size of
their foreign exchange markets, as measured by to-
tal exports and imports. This approach avoids the
problems in trying to estimate the size of the local
currency markets. But it ignores the fact that liquid-
ity in the local securities market has very little to do
with the size of foreign exchange trading. The
ELMI+ attempts to address this by including meas-
ures of liquidity in the index.
One of the results of this formulation is that
countries in Asia represent nearly 40 per cent of the
index, since they have the largest share of trade of
countries in the investment universe. Yet, from a
policy perspective, countries in Asia have the least
need for foreign capital because of their high sav-
ings rates and because they have the least amount of
sovereign debt denominated in foreign currency. This
would reduce the effect of the proposal in solving
the problem of ￿original sin￿. From an investment
perspective, yields in most countries in Asia tend to
be low. Asian currencies also tend to be highly cor-
related owing to their high regional trade links. Thus,
a portfolio based on this approach will tend to be a
higher risk/lower return portfolio. The ELMI+ ap-
proach is consistent from the perspective of building
a publishable index, but it is not the foundation of
an optimal portfolio.11 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
The optimal approach would be to choose
weights that produce the desired return to risk trade-
off in the portfolio. Under this approach, securities
with high yields per unit of risk, or with low covariance
with the portfolio, would be weighted more heavily
than those with lower returns or higher covariance.
This might result in a portfolio that contains rela-
tively more securities from a small country or a coun-
try that exhibits greater volatility but whose returns
are substantially uncorrelated from those of other
countries. One important implication of this last point
is that it has the positive effect of rewarding coun-
tries that successfully pursue independent policies
and achieve independent results.
The complicating issue with this approach is
the difficulty in estimating future returns, volatility,
and correlations since the historical figures are not
always good predictors of future returns.23 This is
especially problematic for currencies that have had
fixed-exchange rate systems, because the past cor-
relations and volatility do not convey the full risk
inherent in the positions. The volatility of a fixed-
exchange rate currency is historically zero, even if
the risk of devaluation is significant. There are sev-
eral ways to address this mathematically, and there
are market indicators that can also be used to assess
volatility and expected returns.24
Even if, for simplicity, the securities were
equally weighted ￿ that is, with weights of 5 per
cent for a portfolio with 20 securities ￿ a set of suf-
ficiently independent security returns can outperform
the return-to-risk of major security indexes. This is
shown below.
Track record
Experiments with investment in local
currency debt
The potential gains from investing in local cur-
rency debt securities were apparent by the mid-1990s
and at least some parts of the private sector were
aware of them. From 1993 to just prior to the Rus-
sian Federation crisis in July 1998, short-term yields
on local currency debt averaged nearly 27 per cent.
The primary risk to investing in local currency debt
is currency volatility and so yields were high to com-
pensate investors for the risk of devaluation. Yet the
actual average currency devaluation over the same
period turned out to be only 14.5 per cent (authors￿
calculations using list of 46 countries, as shown in
appendix B).
Whether it was a fundamental market failure
or a matter of incomplete markets giving rise to
arbitrage opportunities, there were cases of private
sector investors attempting to take advantage of it.
Many broker-dealers set up local currency trading
desks and several asset management financial institu-
tions, that is, ￿buy-side firms￿, launched local cur-
rency funds.25 In the summer of 1996, JP Morgan in-
troduced the Emerging Local Markets Index (ELMI).26
Yet the ELMI, and later the ELMI+, never be-
came a widely followed index. By the end of 1998
many of the new local market funds had shut down.
Most had taken large and concentrated positions in
a few developing countries ￿ notably some large long
positions in the Russian Federation￿ and when the
Russian Federation defaulted the local market funds
came to an end.
In contrast to the funds that made concentrated
bets in a few countries, those that were constructed
from a risk-control perspective survived the crisis
relatively unscathed, with positive returns and low
volatility.27 The successful strategy lay in recogniz-
ing that, despite much of the popular discussion about
currency contagion, correlations across emerging
market currencies had been actually quite low. For
example, returns from investing in local currency
debt of 25 countries from JP Morgan￿s ELMI+ in-
dex returned an averaged 3.03 per cent monthly or
43 per cent annual rate of return over the five months
from August through December 1998.
Highly diversified portfolios that were con-
structed to take advantage of the low correlations
across emerging market currencies produced strong
results, relatively high yields and low variance,
throughout the various emerging market crises.
LCD track record
In order to better illustrate the market risk of
investing in local markets, we have created a sam-
ple LCD portfolio using JP Morgan ELMI+ data.
For simplicity, our sample portfolio equally weights





































weights because, as we explained earlier, the ELMI+
is highly concentrated in Asia and thus is not opti-
mal diversification. In addition, the ELMI+ includes
major currency risks implicit in emerging market
currencies tied to the euro and the yen. For example
the local currency securities in Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic embody exchange rate risk ￿
when measured in dollar ￿ that is closely tied to the
value of the euro. As a result they are more highly
correlated with each other than is desirable for the
purpose of diversification.
The ELMI+ dataset starts in 1994, so we begin
our analysis in that year. The first striking result of
our LCD portfolio is that there is only one calendar
year in which returns were negative. That year is
1997, the timing of the East Asian crisis, when the
LCD portfolio was down -0.78 per cent. In 1994 (the
year of the Mexican crisis), 1998 (the year of the
Russian Federation crisis), and 2001 (the year of the
Argentinean crisis) returns are all positive, at 3.2 per
cent, 17.8 per cent, and 5.3 per cent. In contrast, the
EMBI+ generated negative returns for those years
of -18.9 per cent, -14.4 per cent, and -0.8 per cent.
The second striking result is that the average
risk of the LCD portfolio was only 5.5 per cent from
1994 through 2003, significantly lower than the
EMBI+ risk of 19.3 per cent over the same period.
For comparison, we have also listed the risk/return
profile of the ELMI+, S&P 500, and Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Free
Index of equities (chart 1).
It is important to note that the start date of 1994
has a significant effect on measured returns on all
asset classes. If the data were to start a year earlier,
or a year later, returns would be higher for all emerg-
ing market indices (chart 2).
Another important point that is not shown in
chart 2 is that the volatility of the LCD portfolio is
remarkably consistent over time. We tested the data
for different start dates and found that the volatility
of the LCD portfolio never goes above 6 per cent.
This further exemplifies the power of diversifica-
tion at lowering risk in this asset class. In contrast,
the volatility of the EMBI+ jumps from slightly over
9 per cent to nearly 20 per cent, depending on
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Another comparison ￿ and indeed contrast ￿
that illustrates this point is one with the dollar re-
turns on the FTSE ￿ a sterling-denominated equity
index. This portfolio is diversified across the 100
securities that make up the FTSE index, but it is not
diversified with regard to foreign currencies because
the dollar exchange rate with the sterling introduces
additional risk to the FTSE equity index. The aver-
age annual returns over the same period (January
1995￿January 2003) were 7.52 per cent and the
standard deviation was 17.73 per cent. This repre-
sents a lower yield and higher risk than the LCD
portfolio, and a lower yield for about the same level
of risk for the S&P 500 ￿ or alternatively about the
same yield but much higher risk than a portfolio of
the United States Aaa corporate bonds.
Why the private sector has been slow
to implement this strategy
If the LCD policy is such a good idea, why has
the private sector been so slow to implement it?
There are several answers. One is the disappointing
history of local currency funds in the mid to late
1990s, which led investors to be wary of this asset
class. Most of that disappointment can be attributed
to funds that took large concentrated bets in a few
countries, especially the Russian Federation, and thus
did not maintain a diversified portfolio. Nonethe-
less, these have served as a bad example of local
currency portfolios.
Another reason is that the one local currency
index, the JP Morgan ELMI+, did not perform as
well as a more diversified portfolio.
More recently, local currency capital markets
in some countries have grown, spurring new inves-
tor interest in the asset class. A recent study by the
IMF (2004a) documents several positive develop-
ments in the issuance and trading in local currency
securities in developing countries. The study cites
improvements in clearing trades in local currency
securities and the settlement of payments for such
trades. It also describes expanding liquidity in sec-
ondary markets for these securities, and it identifies
the development of inter-dealer markets as a sign of
great liquidity.
Another IMF report (2004b) describes a new
initiative in Asia, called the Asian Bond Market Ini-
tiative. This initiative includes settlement and ex-
change regulation, a credit guarantee mechanism,
issuance of local currency bonds by non-domestic
issuers, and local rating agencies. Similarly, Mexico
has begun to develop a liquid local currency bond
market. The development of local pension funds in
several Latin American countries, such as Chile, has
also stimulated the development of domestic markets.
As local currency bond markets continued
to develop, there has been more interest in local
currency investments. This was apparent at the De-
cember 2003 Emerging Market Traders Association
meeting at which there was a significant amount of
discussion about the asset class. It is unclear, how-
ever, how much of any increased investment will go
into diversified funds and how much will go into
concentrated positions in the few large markets that
are easily accessible to foreign investors.
Two of the biggest complaints by foreign inves-
tors are the difficulty of accessing some developing
countries￿ local currency securities markets and the
high transaction costs in those markets. Several coun-
tries have complicated tax structures, inefficient
settlement mechanisms, high custodial costs, and
outright restrictions to foreign investment. Foreign
investors have pressured developing countries to
reduce these transaction costs, but the countries have
resisted doing so. Brazil, for example, has one of
the largest domestic securities markets, but it is also
a market where foreign investors find access cum-
bersome.
So, we need to ask the flip side of the questions,
if local debt is so good for developing countries, why
have they sometimes been slow to respond to for-
eign interest?
We believe that there are two main answers to
this question. First, foreign currency financing is
often cheaper than domestic financing the risks in-
herent in foreign currency financing are ignored.
Second, it is possible that countries are wary of in-
ternational institutional investors. These investors are
seen as myopic, bringing in short-term hot money,
overwhelming small capital markets in the good
times, pulling out in the bad times and leading to
boom-bust scenarios or currency crises. Such flows
can add volatility to a local financial markets and
disrupt if not destabilize the economy. In fact, the
problems associated with short-term capital flows
has been the focus of much economic policy litera-14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
ture in recent years.28 Similar to concerns that ex-
cessive dollar debt is linked to crises, so too have
open capital markets.29
In this light, market regulations and local se-
curity market inefficiencies can be viewed as a means
of restricting capital flows. For example, in the early
1990s foreigners were not allowed to purchase Hun-
garian Government debt. Later, as the country moved
towards joining the European Union, the restrictions
were eased so that foreigners could buy debt securi-
ties with remaining maturities of more than one
year.30 In this Hungary was able to use controls on
its local bond market to regulate short-term capital
inflows.
On implication of this insight is that  ￿original
sin￿ is in some cases the result of policy decisions.
Faced with a choice between two evils, opening their
domestic markets to the vicissitudes of short-term
capital flows or borrowing from abroad in foreign
currency, developing countries have often chosen the
later.
The question then becomes, is it possible to
structure local currency portfolios to keep funds in
a country long-term? Can we construct the portfolio
in a way that still gives policymakers the option to
continue to selectively use capital account regula-
tions to limit short-term inflows? The example of
Hungary gives us a hint of how this can be done.
Even when foreigners were not allowed to access
the local bond market directly, they were given the
permission to buy into long-term closed-end funds.31
Alternative ownership structures
Another virtue of the LCD portfolio approach
to financing development is its flexibility and abil-
ity to take on many different structures to the
ownership of the portfolio. The minimum size for
an economically viable portfolio is not very large,
so this would not sharply constrain its use by a vari-
ety of financial institutions. For example, a portfolio
consisting of $2 million in securities from each of
20 countries would amount to a $40 million portfolio.
There are many financial institutions in ad-
vanced economies that are large enough to purchase
and manage a portfolio such as the LCD portfolio,
and most of these have the regulatory authority for
cross-border and foreign currency investments.
These institutions could construct such a portfolio
and hold it as an asset on their balance sheets. Pen-
sion funds and insurance companies could also
operate such a portfolio as a portion of these assets.
Similarly, mutual funds and hedge funds could offer
more direct ownership of such portfolios. In all these
cases, the most important point is that managers
should stick to a diversified approach, and this fea-
ture could be enforced by including diversification
as a requirement in the managed fund prospectus or
pension fund investment guidelines.
Multilateral development banks such as the
World Bank could employ this approach to manage
the risk of lending to its developing country bor-
rowers. The Bank￿s portfolio is already diversified
across lenders, and so this analysis shows how it
could safely lend in local currency instead of its ex-
isting policy of lending in major currencies. Had the
Bank been pursuing this approach all along, it would
have played a much more stabilizing role in devel-
opment finance than it has.
Yet another approach to ownership structure
would be to securitize the LCD portfolio in a man-
ner similar to that successfully pursued by United
States mortgage lending titans Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and Ginnie Mae. They collect together finan-
cial assets into a pool that is held by a trust; the trust
then issues securities known as mortgage-back se-
curities that represent ownership shares of the pool
of assets. These shares can then be traded in a liquid
and transparent secondary market so that the proc-
ess results in price discovery of the return and risk
of the underlying mortgage investments. This attracts
additional capital to the market, provides investors
with greater diversification, and, most of all, helps
the development of good standard market practices
that are often lacking in the market for the underly-
ing assets or securities.
A similar security that would be backed by other
currency debt securities, call it an ￿LCDBS￿, could
be denominated in dollars or any currency. The trust
could be structured to reinvest all proceeds in local
currency debt and then authorized and empowered
to convert the various local currency proceeds into
the currency of denomination (e.g., dollars) in order
to coupon payments on each scheduled payment date
plus the payment of principal at maturity.32 The
choice of reinvestment versus regular coupon pay-
ments could vary so as to suit the preferences of the15 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
investors. Some investors, such as pension funds and
insurance companies, want the regular payments for
cash flow or tax purposes, while other investors
might prefer reinvestment at the internal rate of re-
turn of the portfolio.
As the great wit and sage Yogi Berra warned,
￿If you can￿t copy them, don￿t imitate them.￿ In this
case, however, the application of this experience with
mortgage-backed securities to local currency devel-
oping country debt is fairly straightforward and thus
lends itself to imitation.
The high performance of the LCD portfolio,
which compares favourably with the dollar return
on major United States equity indices, United States
corporate bond returns, and sterling-denominated
FTSE returns, will attract portfolio capital from in-
dividual investors, managed funds, and financial
institutions.
Of course, the LCD portfolio might attract ad-
ditional investor interest if shares were sold on
different classes of the portfolio. This is a common
practice in the securitization of debt through struc-
tured securities, known as collateral debt obligations,
where different tranches of the pool ￿ based on the
priority in which debt service payments fulfill debt
obligation ￿ are sold separately. This generates dif-
ferent classes of shares based on creditworthiness,
such as a class AAA, a class BB, and junk class (i.e.,
speculative grade debt). However, since this LCD
portfolio would not be burdened with very much
credit risk ￿ most developing countries enjoy high
ratings for debt payments in their own currency ￿
the different classes of shares would be differenti-
ated based on market risk. Thus, Class A might offer
a very high likelihood of providing an 8 per cent
return in dollars, while Class B might offer a strong
likelihood of 10 per cent and Class C might offer a
speculative return of 14 per cent. Such structures
have proven time and again in other areas of ad-
vanced financial markets to add significant value to
the portfolio by tailoring the risk-return profile of
the instrument.
Economic and development consequences
The primary goal of helping developing coun-
tries borrow in their own currency is to reduce their
exposure to foreign exchange risk, which has helped
trigger many financial crises in recent decades. But
apart from this, there are additional important eco-
nomic benefits of a widespread adoption of LCD
portfolios and more local currency (and less foreign
currency) debt issuance.
The macroeconomic benefits include:
￿ enabling developing countries to attract more
foreign capital, and to do so in more steady vol-
umes because the returns and risks will be more
akin to those found elsewhere in advanced
economies￿ capital markets;
￿ raising the demand for local currency govern-
ment securities, and by association other local
currency securities, so as to lower the cost of
capital in those markets;
￿ promoting improvements in local financial
markets in the areas of clearing, settlements,
and secondary market trading;
￿ stimulating investment and growth by lower-
ing local currency interest rates and increasing
the maturity and depth of local credit markets;
and
￿ increasing the government￿s revenue from sei-
gniorage by increasing the use of local currency
for trading and servicing local-currency-de-
nominated assets; this together with lower
borrowing costs, will improve the fiscal posi-
tion of developing country governments.
The microeconomic benefits of the LCD port-
folio include:
￿ it will create a new benchmark in international
financial markets;
￿ the portfolio, by eliminating most if not all
￿unique￿ risk from each security, will establish
the price of ￿common￿ or ￿systematic￿ risk in
developing country debt markets;
￿ the new benchmark would ￿price￿ the ￿market
risk￿ ￿ inflation, nominal interest rates and ex-
change rate risk ￿ of investing in developing
country debt instead of the credit risk;
￿ this benchmark rate of return will have the ef-
fect of sharpening competitive pressures on
international investors by identifying where
local-currency rates of return exceed that justi-
fied by the benchmark; and16 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
￿ the local currency interest rates and exchange
rates will have the excess risk premiums priced
out of them.
This new power to borrow abroad must come,
however, with a strong warning. Some developing
economies in the recent past have suffered because
of their governments￿ fiscal imbalances ￿ whereby
large and persistent deficits were financed by bor-
rowing that was subsequently monetized as part of
monetary policy. The consequences for inflation,
output and growth were sometimes dire. In this con-
text, relaxing the constraints on developing country
governments￿ ability to borrow in their currency is
expected to raise concerns about the possible haz-
ard of eliminating the usual discipline of foreign
borrowing.
While expanding the market for local-currency
financial instruments, the LCD policy will not nec-
essarily reward any particular country for pursuing
reckless fiscal or monetary policies, as it does not
guarantee any particular country the right to sell its
local currency securities abroad. It does though
offer a reward for being able to do so, and the magni-
tude of the reward will be proportional to a country￿s
ability to produce a stable economic environment
with lower interest rates and low rates of currency
depreciation. In this regard the policy does not elimi-
nate any disciplinary ￿stick￿, but rather it adds
￿carrots￿.
Conclusion
In this study, we describe how to construct a
portfolio of emerging market local-currency denomi-
nated debt. This portfolio can generate United States
dollar rates of risk-adjusted return that are competi-
tive with familiar financial market benchmarks such
as the S&P 500 and FTSE indexes.
This is a feasible proposal that can be readily
adopted by private financial markets for its profit-
able opportunities, and yet it can also be promoted
at negligible expense through public policies by the
G-7 Governments, the Finance for Development
process at the United Nations and international fi-
nancial institutions such as the World Bank. The
latter could play a helpful role in establishing a dem-
onstration project that would produce market
information on prices, returns and risk that could
stimulate others to follow. In addition, the project
could help finance develop structures that would be
valuable long-term investments.
By comparison to Hausmann￿s plan for an EM
Index, this proposal stands as a simple and more
straightforward policy, as it does not require the ap-
proval and active participation of major currency
governments or international financial institutions
such as the World Bank and IMF. It is also more
flexible in that the portfolio approach can be used to
construct a variety of types of portfolios that can be
directly owned or securitized and can be sold off in
uniform shares or in risk-related tranches.
This proposal stands as an implicit criticism of
official financial institutions that for decades have
failed to identify this policy opportunity that would
allow them to use their already country diversified
portfolio to lend in local currencies. Instead they have
continued practised a policy of lending in major cur-
rencies that has lead to financial crises that resulted
in more debt in major currencies to help developing
countries adjust to shocks from changes in foreign
exchange and interest rates.
Private financial markets too have overlooked,
for the most part, this investment opportunity. In an
industry that prides itself on its innovation and its
top-flight financial analysis of arbitrage opportuni-
ties, this is a large, squandered opportunity. It is an
example of the proverbial $20 bill on the ground,
which theoretical economists believe cannot exist.
This LCD portfolio approach has enormous
potential to promote the maturation of local finan-
cial markets as a development policy. It has the
capacity to not only reduce developing countries￿
vulnerability to financial crises, but also to foster
greater stability and sustained development.17 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
Appendix A
Summary of EM Index proposal
The recent literature on the causes, costs, and
dangers of foreign currency borrowing, that is, the
￿original sin￿ literature, develops a policy proposal
for redemption. The proposal in Hausmann et al.
(2002) consists of three steps. First, construct an in-
dex (called an ￿EM Index￿) to determine the rate of
return on index-linked financial instruments (bank
loans, bonds, and interest rate derivatives). The in-
dex is calculated using the changes in each country￿s
exchange rate and inflation rate and by weighting
each currency in the index by the real output of the
respective country.33 The proposal calls for the World
Bank to calculate the official index.
Second, the IFIs (official international financial
institutions such as the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank) would issue at least
some of their debt denominated in the EM Index.
This would enable those IFIs to lend in local emerg-
ing market currencies while maintaining a match
between the currency denomination of the assets
match and that of their liabilities. Similarly, the G-10
countries, would be called on to issue some of their
debt in the EM Index.
The IFIs and G-10 borrowers, it is argued,
would be motivated by the advantages of diversify-
ing their liabilities or alternatively capturing savings
after swapping their EM Index obligations back into
their respective C-5 currency (dollar, euro, pound
sterling, yen and Swiss franc). This would have the
desirable consequence of creating an otherwise rare
short position in the local currency. The third step
would thus consist of having the developed coun-
tries swap out of C-5-currency-denominated debt
back into their own local currency.
Problems with the EM proposal
Following are some limitations of the EM pro-
posal, as we see them:
1. The proposal is overly complicated relative to
the problem it seeks to solve. It requires indus-
trial country governments to change their debt
management policies to include the use of EM-
Index-linked securities, foreign currencies,
foreign-currency swap transactions, and add-
ing exposure to swap related credit risk from
counterparties. While the Government of Swe-
den has already been successfully developing
more sophisticated debt management policies,
these policy recommendations stand in stark
contrast to the debt management policies in
such countries as the United States. Such a
change in policy might not prove to be directly
beneficial to the United States, Japan, and euro
zone Governments. For example, the policy
change would disrupt, and thereby diminish the
benefits from, regularly scheduled debt auc-
tions. Also, the proposal would require the
G-10 Governments to borrow in a foreign cur-
rency and swap back into their own currency
at time when it might ￿ as well as when it might
not ￿ be cheaper to borrow in their own cur-
rency.
2. Individual developing countries would still not
be borrowing directly in their own currency.
3. The most immediate benefit to developing cur-
rencies from the emergence of the EM Index
would be more (long positions in) foreign cur-
rency swaps that would enable them to swap
out of their hard-currency foreign debts and
other obligations.
4. The EM Index proposal does not clarify how
the index-linked debt and securities are to be
bought, sold, or in general traded. The transac-
tion must be denominated in some single
currency unless the proposal￿s proponents want
the entire basket of currencies to be used. It
would be impractical to buy and sell securities
that require multiple currencies for engaging
in price quotes, negotiations, and settlement. If
the EM Index is comprised of 22 currencies, as
language in the literature suggests, it will re-
quire a basket of 22 currencies to buy or sell.
Otherwise, if it is traded in dollars then it will
not directly help emerging market countries
borrow in their own currency or reduce their
foreign currency exposure ￿ although it would
give them a more diversified exposure.18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 34
Appendix B
List of 46 developing countries included in for-
eign exchange rate analysis:
Argentina Bangladesh Botswana
Brazil Bulgaria Chile
Colombia C￿te d￿Ivoire Croatia








Rep. of Korea Romania Russian Federation
Slovakia Slovenia South Africa




1 The term major currency refers to the C-5, the dollar,
euro, yen, pound sterling and Swiss franc.
2 See Dodd (2001) for an analysis of this dimension of the
problem.
3 One of the authors of this paper, Shari Spiegel, devel-
oped and managed a successful risk-controlled diversi-
fied local currency debt portfolio in 1995 at Lazard As-
set Management.
4 The article will use IMF definitions for terms such as
advanced economies and emerging market economies,
but will use the term developing countries to refer to
both emerging and developing countries.
5 This is also true for most other emerging market econo-
mies and some newly industrialized economies.
6 The numbers add to slightly more than 100 per cent due
to rounding.
7 Stiglitz (2003).
8 For a more thorough discussion of these points see Dodd
(1989), Allen et al. (2002), and Goldstein and Tucker
(2004).
9 Funds that could be used for development are instead
held as reserves. For example, a country might borrow
at 10 per cent, but then need to hold reserves against this
debt in the United States Treasuries at, say, 3 per cent.
For more on this, see the upcoming Initiative for Policy
Dialogue Overview book on Macroeconomics and Capi-
tal Markets Liberalization, forthcoming from Oxford
University Press.
10  For a detailed discussion of this, see the upcoming Over-
view Volume on Macroeconomics and Capital Market
Liberalization by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue:
Ffrench Davis R, Nayyar D, Ocampo JA, Spiegel S, and
Stiglitz J, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
11 The term was coined in Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
12 Eichengreen and Hausmann show econometrically that
a weak policy framework is not the primary reason coun-
tries have been unable to issue debt in domestic curren-
cies; hence the term, ￿original sin￿.
13 Goldstein M and Tucker P (1996).
14 The Lazard Strategic Yield Fund, May 1995 to April
1997. The Lazard Emerging Income Fund 1, from April
1997. The strategy was developed to maintain exposure
to local emerging market currencies, and minimize the
currency risk through diversification.
15 The foundation of portfolio theory in the words of one
of the great contributors to the theory is Sharpe (1970).
16 The term security will be used to describe government
debt instruments, although the portfolio could potentially
contain government loans.
17 Yield and volatility data are taken from average yields
published by the JP Morgan as part of the ELMI+ index,
1994￿2003.
18 The term short-hedger refers to an investors whose busi-
ness normally involves a long position in the local cur-
rency and needs to hedge that exposure by taking a short
position in the derivatives market.
19 Our data for these series were monthly, starting in Janu-
ary 1994 and ending in May 2004, although some coun-
tries do not have observations for the entire period.
20 The dollar is chosen as an example. The same would be
true for other currencies. The rate of return refers to the
sum of interest payments and any change in price of the
security. This equation yields a continuous time version:
r = r* + e . + r*e ..
21 Duration is the weighted average of the maturity of the
sum of the bond￿s cash flows, with the weights calcu-
lated by the present value of the corresponding cash
flows. It reflects the marginal interest rate risk owing to
convexity.
22 This approach to weights is in contrast to that of Haus-
mann et al. for their EM Index approach (appendix A),
in which the index weights are decided by GDP. That
would result in the largest countries having the largest
impact on the index and their currencies being in greater
demand in subsequent transactions. This would replicate
and reinforce one of the causes of ￿original sin￿, namely,
the size of the economy.
23 A succinct warning could be drawn from Yogi Berra￿s
observation that ￿the future is not what it used to be￿.
24 One tested method is to use a jump diffusion model in-
stead of a normal distribution. While this approach is
useful in determining optimal weights, the results do not
alter the general portfolio thesis.
25 To name a few: Lazard Asset Management launched a
Local Currency Trust in 1995, ANZ Asset Management
and Morgan Stanley Asset Management launched funds
soon thereafter, and other asset managers launched re-
gional funds.
26 The ELMI was later supplemented by the ELMI+. The
new index includes more countries and uses currency
forwards to estimate local yields.
27 The Lazard Asset Management Local Currency Trust and
affiliated funds is the one fund the authors know of that
maintained a diversified investment strategy, based on a
risk-management perspective.19 Up From Sin: A Portfolio Approach to Financial Salvation
28 Rodrik D and Velasco A (2000).
29 World Bank (2000); and Demirguc-Kunt A and Detragiache E
(2001).
30 Eventually the market was made fully open.
31 One of the authors, Shari Spiegel, also managed one of
the first local currency fixed income closed-end funds
in the Hungarian domestic market in the early 1990s.
One tranche of the fund was open to foreign investors.
32 Note that mortgage-backed securities involve a similar
process of collecting receipts from the many mortgages
in the portfolio, whose payments fall across many dif-
ferent dates, and then efficiently managing these cash
flows until they are paid out on regularly scheduled pay-
ment dates.
33 Real output is measured by the purchasing power parity
(PPP) value of the gross domestic product (GDP) and
inflation is measured by the consumer price index (CPI).
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